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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJ: MBFR: OPTION III: SERVICE SUB-CEILINGS WITHIN A COMBINED

AIR/GROUND COMMON CEILING

REF: USNATO 4009 DTG 301705Z JUL 75

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS THE TEXT OF DRAFT REPORT ON SERVICE SUB-CEILINGS, WHICH MBFR WORKING GROUP WILL CONSIDER AT AUGUST 12 MEETING.

2. ACTION REQUESTED: GUIDANCE PER PARA 12, REFTTEL, PRIOR TO THE AUGUST 12 WG MEETING.

3. BEGIN TEXT

INTRODUCTION

1. IN PREVIOUS REPORTS(1)(2) ON STUDIES CONCERNED WITH THE IMPLICATIONS OF INCLUDING AIR MANPOWER IN MBFR, THE MBFR WORKING GROUP HAVE EXAMINED THE MILITARY/ TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING ON AGREGATE
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GROUND/AIR MANPOWER. IN ONE OF THOSE STUDIES (3), THE WORKING GROUP FOUND THAT TWO APPROACHES STUDIED (BOTH INVOLVING NUMERIC SUB-CEILINGS, EITHER ON BOTH GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER, OR ON AIR MANPOWER ALONE) WOULD BE WHOLLY COMPATIBLE WITH THE DECLARED

ALLIED OBJECTIVES(4) IN MBFR. TWO OTHER APPROACHES EXAMINED (INVOLVING RESPECTIVELY NO SUB-CEILINGS AND A SUB-CEILING ON AIR MANPOWER ONLY) WERE ALSO EXAMINED. THE WORKING GROUP FOUND THAT THESE LATTER APPROACHES MIGHT NOT BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE ALLIED FOCUS, SINCE TECHNICALLY THEY WOULD NOT PRECLUDE GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS AT THE EXPENSE OF AIR, UNLESS SOME TYPE MEASURE (I.E. NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE) CAN BE DEvised TO COMPLEMENT THESE APPROACHES.

2. LATER PROPOSALS(5) WERE MADE FOR STUDY OF THE DESIRABILITY AND IMPLICATIONS OF ARRANGING CEILINGS OR SUB-CEILINGS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ALLOW SOME LIMITED FREEDOM, FOR NATO, POST-MBFR, TO TRANSFER MANPOWER BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES AND THUS RETAIN THE FLEXIBILITY TO RESTRUCTURE THE FORCES.

FOOTNOTES: (1) AC/276-D(74)12 AND 14 (2) AC/276-D(75)5
(3) AC/276-D(74)14 (4) C-M(73)83 (FINAL)
(5) USNATO/POL/OUT/NS/74-154 OF 2 DEC 74 AND USNATO/POL/OUT/NS/
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3. THE WORKING GROUP SEEK, IN THIS RESPECT, TO COMPLETE, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, THEIR STUDY OF THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ISSUES RAISED AT PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE, TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE POSSIBILITY OF APPLYING, WHERE APPROPRIATE, SOME TYPE MEASURE (I.E. NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE) TO COMPLEMENT APPROACHES INVOLVING NO SUB-CEILING ON GROUND MANPOWER, VIDE PARA 1 ABOVE.

SCOPE OF THE REPORT

4. THE REPORT SETS OUT, AS BACKGROUND TO THE CURRENT STUDY, THE ALLIED OBJECTIVES IN MBFR. IT THEN DISCUSSES THE LEVEL OF FLEXIBILITY REQUIRED TO ENABLE TRANSFERS BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER POST-MBFR. IT ADDRESSES THE IMPLICATIONS,
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IN CONTEXT, OF POSSIBLE REDEFINITION OF FORCES; AND FINALLY EXAMINES SOME POSSIBLE CEILING AND SUB-CEILING APPROACHES.

ALLIED OBJECTIVES IN MBFR

5. THE ALLIED OBJECTIVES IN MBFR, TAKEN INTO FULL CONSIDERATION IN PREVIOUS WORKING GROUP STUDIES OF THE INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN MBFR AND OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUBJ-CEILINGS, REMAIN ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED. THESE OBJECTIVES REQUIRE, INTER ALIA, THAT EACH SIDE SHOULD UNDERTAKE A COMMITMENT TO THE ESTABLISHMENT, AS THE GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES IN THE FORM OF A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING, APPROPRIATE DEFINED IN PHASE I, ON OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ON EACH SIDE IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, TO BE COMPLETED IN PHASE 2. THESE OBJECTIVES ALSO REQUIRE THE SOVIET UNION IN PHASE 1 TO WITHDRAW FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS

A TANK ARMY CONSISTING OF 5 DIVISION INCLUDING SOME
68,000 SOVIET SOLDIERS AND 1,700 MAIN BATTLE TANKS:
FOR ITS PART, THE UNITED STATES WOULD WITHDRAW IN PHASE 1
29,000 US SOLDIERS. PROPOSALS FOR
INCLUSION OF CERTAIN US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS IN PHASE 1 OF MBFR,
CURRENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION IN THE ALLIANCE, REAFFIRM THOSE
OBJECTIVES.

6. FURTHER PROPOSALS, FOR THE EXTENSION OF THE
COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING TO INCLUDE AIR MANPOWER IN THE AREA
OF REDUCTIONS, WITHOUT REQUIRED AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS, ARE
ALSO CURRENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION IN THE ALLIANCE. THOSE
PROPOSALS, IF ADOPTED, WOULD BE DESIGNED TO FURTHER, NOT TO
MODIFY, THE ALLIED OBJECTIVES SET OUT IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH.

7. THE WORKING GROUP HAVE PREVIOUSLY EXAMINED, AGAINST THE
BACKGROUND OF THOSE ALLIED OBJECTIVES, THE IMPLICATIONS OF
SEVERAL APPROACHES TO DEFINING AND IMPLEMENTING A COMBINED
GROUND/AIR COMMON CEILING. THESE APPROACHES EMBRACE, ON ONE
EXTREME, TOTAL FREEDOM TO TRANSFER BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR AND,
ON THE OTHER, RIGIDLY DEFINED NUMERICAL COLLECTIVE CEILINGS
FOR GROUND AND FOR AIR PERSONNEL. TOTAL FREEDOM TO MIX(1), IF
UNCONSTRAINED, WOULD ENABLE BOTH SIDES TO INCREASE GROUND
MANPOWER AT THE EXPENSE OF AIR AND VICE VERSA: THE WARSAW
PACT COULD, IF NOT CONSTRAINED, REPLACE THE GROUND MANPOWER
REDUCED, BY REDUCING THEIR AIR MANPOWER. THIS WOULD BE CONTRARY
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TO CURRENTLY STATED ALLIED OBJECTIVES AND REQUIREMENTS AS SUM-
MARISED ABOVE.

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8. AT THE OTHER EXTREME, RIGID NUMERICAL COLLECTIVE SUB-CEILINGS ON GROUND PERSONNEL FOR BOTH SIDES WOULD MAINTAIN THE ALLIED MBFR OBJECTIVES, AS DEFINED ABOVE. THIS WOULD ALLOW TRANSFER FROM GROUND TO AIR, BUT NOT VICE VERSA. APPLICATION OF RIGID NUMERICAL SUB-CEILINGS ON BOTH GROUND AND AIR PERSONNEL WOULD INHIBIT TRANSFERS IN EITHER DIRECTION.

9. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH RIGIDITY ARE DIFFICULT TO FORECAST. KNOWN NATIONAL FORECASTS, WHICH NORMALLY COVER A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS AHEAD, DO NOT SPECIFY ANY REQUIREMENT TO INCREASE GROUND PERSONNEL AT THE EXPENSE OF AIR OR VICE VERSA.

FOOTNOTE

(1) THIS TOTAL FREEDOM IN PRACTICE WOULD BE STRICTLY CONSTRAINED FOR BOTH SIDES, BY THE PRACTICAL NECESSITY TO MAINTAIN THEIR AIR FORCES AT A LEVEL SUFFICIENT TO MEET COMMITMENTS, INCLUDING AIR DEFENCE AND SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES. SEE PARA 12 BELOW. HOWEVER, FOR THE LONGER TERM, SUCH RESTRUCTURING SHOULD NOT BE RULED OUT. IT CAN BE ENVISAGED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IMPROVEMENT
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AND TECHNICAL ADVANCES (ALREADY KNOWN) OF SSM LAUNCHING SYSTEMS AND WARHEADS COULD ENTAIL SOME ADJUSTMENTS IN GROUND AND AIR TASKING AND CONSEQUENT TRANSFERS OF RESOURCES BETWEEN THE TWO ELEMENTS. FURTHERMORE, RATIONALISATION COULD SIMILARLY INVOLVE INCREASE OF ONE SERVICE AND THE REDUCTION OF THE OTHER.

10. WHILE IT IS APPRECIATED THAT PROVISION FOR RENEGOTIATION OR REVIEW AFTER A FIXED PERIOD WILL PROBABLY BE INCLUDED IN ANY MBFR AGREEMENT, ADOPTION OF RIGID NUMERICAL SUB-CEILINGS IN SUCH AN AGREEMENT COULD INHIBIT THE POSSIBLE TRANSFERS ENVISAGED AND COULD BE DIFFICULT TO RENEGOTIATE. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE PRUDENT:

A. TO IDENTIFY, AND QUANTIFY TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, THE DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY REQUIRED TO SAFEGUARD ALLIED INTERESTS.

B. TO EXAMINE THE IMPLICATIONS OF VARIOUS MEANS OF PERMITTING LIMITED FREEDOM TO TRANSFER BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR PERSONNEL, POST-MBFR, WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS DERIVING FROM A. ABOVE.

DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY REQUIRED

11. THE DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY ALLOWED FOR TRANSFER BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES SHOULD BE BASED AT A LEVEL WHICH WOULD ENSURE A REASONABLE ALLOWANCE FOR POSSIBLE ALLIED RESTRUCTURING: AND WHICH, AT THE SAME TIME, WOULD ENSURE THAT THE ALLIED OBJECTIVES ARE MAINTAINED AND THUS, IN PARTICULAR, THAT THE NUMBER OF MEN WHICH THE WARSAW PACT COULD TRANSFER FROM AIR

TO GROUND FORCES WOULD BE TOLERABLE TO THE ALLIANCE. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY KNOWN REQUIREMENT FOR SUCH TRANSFERS BY THE ALLIES, THE UPPER NUMERICAL LIMIT FOR SUCH A FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE MUST NECESSARILY BE SET AT A NUMBER OF MEN WHICH, IF TRANSFERRED BY THE WARSAW PACT, WOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE ALLIED REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN UNDIMINISHED SECURITY POST-MBFR. SUCH A TRANSFER, AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF ALLIED STUDIES AND PROPOSALS, WOULD MOST LIKELY BE A WP TRANSFER FROM AIR TO GROUND PERSONNEL. ASSUMING THAT THE ALLIED OBJECTIVE OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES IS ACHIEVED (INVOLVING VERY SUBSTANTIALLY ASYMMETRIC GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTIONS BY THE WP AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY IN PHASE 1), IT WOULD BE MILITARILY TOLERABLE TO ALLOW THE WARSAW PACT FREEDOM TO TRANSFER UP TO 20,000 MEN BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR. THAT FIGURE SHOULD BE THE UPPER LIMIT OF ANY FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE CONTEMPLATED.

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12. THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE WARSAW PACT COULD OR WOULD EXPLOIT THIS FREEDOM CANNOT BE DETERMINED. AT THE PEAK (20,000), IT WOULD AMOUNT TO 10 PCT OF THE WP AIR FORCE MANPOWER AND WOULD PROBABLY INVOLVE SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS/WITHDRAWALS OF WP AIRCRAFT OR READINESS, OR BOTH. ANY SOVIET AIR ELEMENTS WITHDRAWN AS A RESULT COULD, OF COURSE, REMAIN AVAILABLE FOR REINTRODUCTION AT VERY SHORT NOTICE. NEVERTHELESS, THERE WOULD BE A STRICT POINT, PROBABLY AT A FIGURE BELOW 20,000, WHEN AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS FOR THE WP WOULD BEAR SUBSTANTIALLY ON THE SIZE AND/OR READINESS OF THE WP AIR FORCES, AND HENCE AN OVERALL COMBAT CAPABILITY.

13. FROM THE ALLIED POINT OF VIEW, AN ALLOWANCE OF 20,000 WOULD BE MORE THAN SUFFICIENT TO PERMIT ANY CONCEIVABLE RESTRUCTURING WITHIN A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING FOR GROUND/AIR PERSONNEL. IN THAT CONNECTION, IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT RESTRUCTURING BY ALLIED NATIONS IS UNLIKELY TO BE ALL IN ONE DIRECTION (E.G. GROUND TO AIR); AND THAT SOME ALLIED REQUIREMENTS COULD THEREFORE COMPENSATE FOR EACH OTHER.

14. THE TOLERABLE UPPER LIMIT OF THE FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE (ASSESSED AT 20,000 ASSUMING ACHIEVEMENT OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES) WOULD REQUIRE RECONSIDERATION IF, AFTER NEGOTIATION, THERE REMAINED A SUBSTANTIAL DISPARITY BETWEEN NATO AND WP GROUND FORCE LEVELS. WITH THE RESULTANT LOWER LEVELS OF ALLIED ACTIVE FORCES IN PLACE IN THE NGA AND AN AGREED DISPARITY OF (SAY) 30,000, A FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE OF A FURTHER 20,000 COULD INCREASE THAT RESIDUAL DISPARITY TO UNDESIRABLE HIGH LEVELS.

REDEFINITION OF FORCES

15. THE FOREGOING COMMENTS ARE MADE IN THE LIGHT OF THE ASSUMPTION THAT FORCES WOULD BE ADDRESSED - AND THEIR MANPOWER COUNTED - IN MBFR ON THE BASIS OF ALLIED APPROACH TO DEFINITION OF FORCES, I.E. ON THE BASIS OF COLOUR OF UNIFORM.

REDEFINITION, ON THE BASIS PROPOSED BY THE WARSAW PACT, OR TRANSFER OF CERTAIN ELEMENTS FROM GROUND TO AIR (OR VICE VERSA) IN RECOGNITION OF ANOMALIES, WOULD INVOLVE, FOR THE WARSAW PACT, AN INCREASE IN MANPOWER COUNTED BY NATO AS AIR, AND A DECREASE IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. THE NUMBER
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INVOLVED, ON THE BASIS OF ALLIED ASSESSMENTS OF THE STRENGTH OF ANOMALOUS ELEMENTS, IS 30,000: ON THE WARSAW PACT DEFINITION, THE NUMBER COULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY HIGHER. THERE WOULD BE A SMALL INCREASE IN THE MANPOWER COUNTED AS ALLIED GROUND MANPOWER.

16. CHANGES ON THOSE BASES WOULD NOT, IN THEMSELVES, SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE REQUIRED LEVEL OF A COMMON CEILING FOR GROUND FORCES, CALCULATED ON THE BASIS THAT ALLIED GROUND FORCES WILL NOT BE REDUCED BY MORE THAN ABOUT 10 PCT.

17. IF, HOWEVER, A COMBINED GROUND/AIR COMMON CEILING WERE INTRODUCED WITHOUT AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS BY THE ALLIES, THEN THE WARSAW PACT, TO CONFORM TO A CEILING, WOULD NECESSAIRLY:

A. REDUCE REDEFINED GROUND FORCE MANPOWER TO A RESIDUAL LEVEL LOWER THAN ALLIED CEILING, BY THE AMOUNT OF THE DISPARITY BETWEEN ALLIED AND WP AIR MANPOWER, AS COUNTED UNDER THE REVISED APPROACH.

B. REDUCE AIR FORCE MANPOWER BY UP TO THE SAME AMOUNT.

C. OPERATE A COMBINATION OF A. AND B.

18. MILITARILY, THE ALLIES SHOULD INSIST OF A. ABOVE, SINCE THE PLACEMENT OF ELEMENTS IN AIR RATHER THAN GROUND FORCE FOR PURPOSES OF MBFR WOULD NOT CHANGE THE THREAT, AS SEEN BY THE ALLIES. IT REDUCES THE ASSESSED DISPARITY IN THE GROUND FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES AND INCREASES THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE AIR FORCE MANPOWER LEVELS.

IT WOULD, HOWEVER, BE UNREALISTIC TO ENVISAGE THAT THE ALLIES, HAVING RECOGNISED ANOMALIES AND REDEFINED GROUND FORCES ACCORDINGLY, COULD THEN SUSTAIN A CASE FOR WP GROUND FORCE MANPOWER, AS REDEFINED, TO BE AT A LOWER RESIDUAL LEVEL THAN ALLIED GROUND MANPOWER. THERE IS A HIGH PROBABILITY THAT THE BEST ACHIEVABLE SOLUTION WOULD BE PARITY IN MANPOWER OF THE GROUND FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES AS REDEFINED. THAT ARRANGEMENT, ASSUMING THAT NO AIR REDUCTIONS WERE MADE BY THE ALLIES, WOULD THEN LEAD LOGICALLY TO TWO CEILINGS:

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A. A COMMON CEILING FOR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER.

B. FIXED CEILINGS, AT CURRENT LEVELS FOR AIR FORCES AS
REDEFINED, AND AT LEVELS DIFFERENT (BY ABOUT 40,000) FOR THE TWO SIDES.

19. IT WOULD STILL BE TECHNICALLY PARTICABLE, HOWEVER, IF THAT
POSITION WERE REACHED, TO DEVISE AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH ALLOWED LIMITED
FREEDOM TO INCREASE EITHER OF THOSE CEILINGS AT THE EXPENSE OF
REDUCING THE OTHER.

POSSIBLE CEILING ARRANGEMENTS, WITHIN A COMBINED GROUND/AIR COMMON
CEILING, ALLOWING LIMITED FREEDOM TO TRANSFER BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR

20. IN AN ENVIRONMENT WITHOUT SEPARATE CONSTRAINTS ON GROUND
OR AIR FORCES (ONLY ON THE AGGREGATE OF THE TWO) IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE
FOR THE WP FORCES TO RESTRUCTURE THE GROUND/AIR MIX IN SUCH A WAY AS
TO
CHANGE AND POSSIBLY THREATEN THE BALANCE IN THE AREA. ANY
INCREASE IN GROUND OR AIR MANPOWER, WITHIN THE OVERALL CONSTRAINT
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IMPOSED BY THE COMBINED CEILING, WOULD HAVE TO BE AT THE EXPENSE OF
THE OTHER SERVICE. IN A POST-REDUCTION ENVIRONMENT WITHOUT SUB-CEILINGS

ON GROUND FORCES, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE WP TO REINSTATE ITS
GROUND FORCE LEVELS, ALTHOUGH THIS COULD ONLY BE DONE BY CORRESPONDINGLY
REDUCING AIR MANPOWER. FIXED SUB-CEILINGS WOULD PREVENT SUCH
AN ACTION BUT WOULD NECESSARILY BE RECIPROCAL, THUS CONSTRAINING
NATO'S ABILITY TO TRANSFER PERSONNEL AND RESTRUCTURE FORCES.
GIVEN THESE CONUNTERVAILING NEEDS, THERE ARE ESSENTIALLY
THREE APPROACHES WHICH COULD BOTH LIMIT THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE
WP COULD DEVIATE FROM POST-REDUCTION LEVELS AND AT THE SAME

TIME PROVIDE SOME FLEXIBILITY FOR RESTRUCTURING; THESE ARE:

A. NON-EXPLICIT SUB-CEILINGS(I.E. NOT DEFINED NUMERICALLY).

B. EXPLICIT SUB-CILINGS, SUBJECT TO A PRESCRIBED VARIATION WITHIN A FLEXIBILTY ALLOWANCE.

C. OVERLAPPING SUB-CEILINGS.

NON-EXPLICIT SUB-CILIINGS

21. THE ISSUE OF SEVICE SUB-CEILINGS WITHINA COLLECTIVE GROUND/AIR COMMONCEILING NEED NOT BE ADDRESSED IN A FORM WHICH WOULD PRESCRIBE EXPLICIT, NUMERIC SUB-CEILINGS. THE CEILINGS WOULD RESULT (DE FACTO) FROM IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREED REDUCTIONS. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY, IN ORDER TO CONSTRAIN SUBSTANTIAL DEVIATIONS FROM THOSE RESIDUAL LEVELS, TO INCLUDE A CLAUSE IN THE MBFR AGREEMENT RESTRAINING BOTH SIDES FROM RESTRUCTURING GROUND OR AIR FORCES IN SUCH A WAY AS TO SIGNIFICANTLY DEPART FROM THE SERVICE MANPOWER RELATIONSHIPS (RATIO) EXISITING AFTER THE REDUCTIONS, OR TO CIRCUMVENT THE NATURE OF THE REDUCTIONS.

2.2. IF THE REDUCTIONS THEMSELVES WERE STRUCTURED IN SUCH A WAY (E.G. BY MAJOR UNITS) THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT

COULD BE VERIFIED READILY, AND GROSS DEVIATIONS IDENTIFIED QUICKLY POST-MBFR, SUCH NON-EXPLICIT SUB-CEILINGS WOULD BE EFFECTIVE. IF, HOWEVER, THE REDUCTIONS WERE EXPRESSED IN MANPOWER ALONE, VERIFICATION POST-MBFR OF RESIDUAL MANPOWER LEVELS COLD NOT BE GUARANTEED. IN ESSENCE, THE NON-EXPLICIT SUB-CEILING
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APPROACH WOULD BE EFFECTIVE FOR MBFR IMPLEMENTED ON THE PATTERN OF ALLIED PHASE 1 PROPOSALS: IT MIGHT NOT BE FOR PHASE 2.

23. THE NON-EXPLICIT SUB-CEILING COUPLED WITH A NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE AS ENVISAGED ABOVE MIGHT PROVIDE THE EAST WITH OPPORTUNITY TO OBJECT TO RTRIVAIAL ALLIED FORCE CHANGES.

24. THE REMAINING APPROACHES EXAMINED EACH INVOLVE THE PLACEMENT OF A NUMERIC LEVEL ON SUB-CILINGS.

EXPLICIT NUMERIC SUB-CEILINGS

25. EXPLICIT NUMERIC SUB-CEILINGS WOULD INVOLVE PLACING A FIXED, SPECIFIC NUMBER OF AGGREGATE GROUND OR AIR MANPOWER OR BOTH, WITHIN AN EQUALLY SPECIFIC NUMBER FOR THE AGGREGATE OF THE TWO. FLEXIBILITY COULD BE ACHIEVED BY DEFINING EITHER A NUMBER OF PERSONNEL OR A PERCENTAGE OF ONE OR MORE OF THE CEILINGS, WITHIN

WHICH THE FORCES OF EITHER SIDE WOULD BE FREE TO TRANSFER BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR.

26. THIS ARRANGMENT WOULD BE EFFECTIVE, IF HONOURED. IT WOULD PROVIDE THE REQUIRED LEGAL CONSTRAINT ON THE ABILITY OF THE WARSAW PACT TO TRANSFER MEN FROM AIR TO GROUND FORCES. IT WOULD ALSO PROVIDE THE FLEXIBILITY WHICH IS IMPORTANT TO THE ALLIES TO RETAIN FREEDOM FOR RESTRUCTURING ON A LIMITED SCALE.

27. THE ARRANGEMENT WOULD, HOWEVER, DEFINE THE DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY IN MANPOWER ALONE. VERIFICATION OF THE PRECISE NUMBER OF MEN TRANSFERRED BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR WOULD BE IMPRACTICABLE EXCEPT BY AN UNACCEPTABLY INTRUSIVE INSPECTION SYSTEM: AND IN ANY CASE COULD NOT BE GUARANTEED.

OVERLAPPING SUB-CEILINGS.

38. UNDER THIS ARRANGEMENT, THERE WOULD BE SPECIFIED MAXIMUM FORCE STRENGTHS FOR BOTH GROUND AND AIR FORCES. HOWEVER, THE COMBINED TOTAL OF BOTH GROUND AND AIR WOULD EXCEED THE OVERALL COMMON CEILING. TUS, EITHER SERVICE COULD BE INCREASED, AT THE COST OF DECREASING THE OTHER, BUT ONLY WITHIN SPECIFIED AMOUNTS.

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29. THE EFFECTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THIS ARRANGEMENT IN MILITARY/TECHNICAL TERMS WOULD BE SIMILAR TO THOSE DISCUSSED FOR THE EXPLICIT NUMERIC SUB-CEILINGS WITH A FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE, AT PARAGRAPHS 25 TO 27 ABOVE.

DETAIL

30. A MORE DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE POSSIBLE APPROACHES IS INCLUDED AT ANNEX.

FINDINGS

31. THE WORKING GROUP FIND THAT:

A. ASSUMING ALLIED NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES ARE ACHIEVED (SUBSTANTIALLY ASYMMETRIC GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS BY THE WP LEADING TO APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES AND INVOLVING THE WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY IN PHASE 1), IT WOULD BE MILITARILY TOLERABLE TO ALLOW THE WP FREEDOM TO TRANSFER UP TO 20,000 MEN BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES.

B. THE SCALE OF FREEDOM TO TRANSFER MANPOWER WOULD BE MORE THAN SUFFICIENT TO PERMIT ANY CONCEIVABLE RESTRUCTURING WITHIN A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING FOR GROUND/SIR PERSONNEL.

C. THE TOLERABLE UPPER LIMIT OF FREEDOM TO TRANSFER WOULD REQUIRE RECONSIDERATION IF, AFTER REDUCTIONS, THERE REMAINED A SUBSTANTIAL DISPARITY BETWEEN NATO AND WP GROUND

MANPOWER LEVELS.

D. MEANS CAN BE FOUND WHICH WOULD TECHNICALLY PERMIT TRANSFERS OF PERSONNEL BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES, WITHIN DEFINED LIMITS. VERIFICATION OF ADHERENCE TO THESE LIMITS COULD NOT BE GUARANTEED.

E. THERE WOULD BE RISK IN SETTling A SPECIFIC SCALE OR, OR LIMITED FREEDOM TO TRANSFER BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR, POST-MBFR, UNTIL CLEARER INDICATION OF THE SCALE OF REDUCTIONS BY, AND RESIDUAL LEVELS OF, BOTH SIDES.

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ANNEX

INTRODUCTION

1. THE MBFR WORKING GROUP HAVE PREVIOUSLY EXAMINED THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF POSSIBLE APPROACHES FOR THE INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN A COMMON CEILING WITHOUT ADDRESSING AIR MANPOWER FOR REDUCTIONS(1). IN THAT EXAMINATION, FOUR POSSIBLE APPROACHES WHICH EMBRACE AIR AND GROUND MANPOWER IN A COMMON CEILING WERE ENVISAGED, AND WHICH VARY ONLY AS TO THE SPECIFICATION OF AGGREGATE SERVICE SUB-CEILINGS, IF ANY. THOSE APPROACHES ARE:

A. APPROACH 1: SPECIFIES NO SERVICE SUB-CEILINGS.

B. APPROACH 2: SPECIFIES SUB-CEILINGS ON AIR AND GROUND

MANPOWER.

C. APPROACH 3: SPECIFIES A SUB-CEILING ON GROUND MANPOWER ONLY.

D. APPROACH 4: SPECIFIES A SUB-CEILING ON AIR MANPOWER ONLY.

2. THIS WG REPORT(1) EXAMINED, INTER ALIA, THE IMPLICATIONS OF THESE FOUR APPROACHES FOR ALLIED FORCE RESTRUCTURING AND FOR SECRET

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MAINTENANCE OF THE ALLIED OBJECTIVE OF ACHIEVING ASYMMETRICAL GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS LEADING TO APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND MANPOWER. ALTHOUGH NOT SO EXPLICITLY STATED, THE REPORT SHOWS THAT:

A. APPROACH 1 WOULD PROVIDE MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY TO BOTH SIDES IN RESTRUCTURING THEIR FORCES UNDER A COMBINED AIR/GROUND COMMON CEILING; HOWEVER, IT WOULD FAIL TO MEET THE ALLIED OBJECTIVE OF MAINTAINING THE FOCUS ON GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS.

B. APPROACH 2 WOULD PRECLUDE ANY FLEXIBILITY IN THE RESTRUCTURING OF FORCES, BUT WOULD MAINTAIN THE FOCUS ON GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS.

FOOTNOTE:

(1) AC/276-D(74)14

C. APPROACH 3 WOULD PROVIDE SOME FLEXIBILITY IN RESTRUCTURING FORCES BY PERMITTING AIR MANPOWER IN THE NGA TO BE INCREASED AT THE EXPENSE OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND WOULD MAINTAIN THE FOCUS ON GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS.

D. APPROACH 4 WOULD PROVIDE SOME FLEXIBILITY IN RESTRUCTURING FORCES BY PERMITTING GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE NGA TO BE INCREASED AT THE EXPENSE OF AIR MANPOWER, BUT WOULD FAIL TO MAINTAIN THE FOCUS ON GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS.

3. THUS, EACH OF THE FOUR APPROACHES, IF UNQUALIFIED, FAILS, IN SOME RESPECT, TO MEET COMPLETELY BOTH THE REQUIREMENT TO RETAIN FLEXIBILITY IN RESTRUCTURING FORCES AND TO MAINTAIN THE FOCUS ON GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS. IN THE SUCCEEDING PARTS THE WORKINGS GROUP EXAMINE IN MORE DETAIL THE POSSIBLE QUALIFICATIONS TO THESE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH MIGHT PROVIDE THE REQUIRED FLEXIBILITY FOR RESTRUCTURING. THESE ASPECTS WERE NOT EXAMINED IN THE ORIGINAL WORKING GROUP REPORT.

4. AN "IDEAL" APPROACH, FROM THE ALLIED MILITARY VIEWPOINT, WOULD BE ONE WHICH PERMITS MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY IN THE RESTRUCTURING OF NATO FORCES WHILE CONSTRAINING WP FORCES FROM SUCH RESTRUCTURING, PARTICULARLY IN RESPECT OF AN INCREASE IN WP GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. BUT IT WOULD BE UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THE EAST TO AGREE ANY SUCH "IDEAL" APPROACH. ANY MEASURES OR APPROACHES WHICH ARE IMPOSED TO PREVENT CIRCUMVENTION OF REDUCTIONS WILL HAVE TO APPLY AS MUCH TO NATO FORCES REDUCED OR WITHDRAWN FROM THE NGA AS TO WP FORCES. THE ONLY IDENTIFIABLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE "IDEAL", THEN, ARE THOSE APPROACHES WHICH, WHEN APPLIED TO BOTH NATO AND WP SECRET

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FORCES IN THE NGA, WOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE ALLIED OBJECTIVE TO MAINTAIN THE FOCUS ON GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS AND YET NOT UNDULY CONSTRAIN FORCE RESTRUCTURING.

5. THE APPROACHES EXAMINED FALL INTO THE "LIMITED FREEDOM-TO-MIX" CATEGORY, A CATEGORY FIRST SUGGESTED BY THE US IN THE PAPER ON THE "ROLE OF AIR MANPOWER IN MBFR"(1). THESE ALTERNATIVES PROVIDE, TO VARYING DEGREES, LIMITED FLEXIBILITY IN FORCE RESTRUCTURING AND TO VARYING DEGREES, MAINTENANCE OF THE FOCUS ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS EXAMINATION, THESE ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES ARE IDENTIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

- A. NON-EXPLICIT SUB-CEILINGS.
- B. FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE FOR SUB-CEILINGS.
- C. OVERLAPPING SUB-CEILINGS.

NON-EXPLICIT SUB-CEILINGS.

6. UNDER THIS APPROACH, AN MBFR AGREEMENT WOULD NOT ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF SERVICE SUB-CEILINGS IN AN EXPLICIT NUMERIC NUMBER (1). IT DIFFERS FROM APPROACH 1 (WHICH SPECIFIES NO SERVICE SUB-CEILINGS), IN THAT THE DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY TO RESTRUCTURE FORCES IN A POST-REDUCTION ENVIRONMENT (WHICH IS UNLIMITED UNDER APPROACH 1) WOULD BE LIMITED BY THE INCLUSION OF A PROVISION IN THE MBFR AGREEMENT, WHICH THE US HAS SUGGESTED (2) MIGHT BE: "NEITHER SIDE WILL

FOOTNOTES: (1) USNATO/POL/OUT/NS/74 54 OF 2 DEC 74

(2) USNATO/POL/OUT/NS/75-5

RESTRUCTURE FORCES BETWEEN SERVICES IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ALTER SIGNIFICANTLY THE SERVICE MANPOWER RELATIONSHIPS (RATIO) EXISTING AFTER THE REDUCTIONS OR TO CIRCUMVENT THE NATURE OF THE REDUCTIONS".

7. UNDER SUCH A PROVISION, THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE RATIO OF AIR TO GROUND FORCE MANPOWER COULD BE ALTERED IN A POST-REDUCTION ENVIRONMENT BEFORE THE ALTERATION BECOMES "SIGNIFICANT" IS UNCLEAR. IT IS CLEAR THAT SOME DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY TO RESTRUCTURE FORCES IS PERMISSIBLE, BUT THAT DEGREE IS LIMITED NOT ONLY BY THE WORD "SIGNIFICANTLY", BUT ALSO BY THE PHRASE "OR TO CIRCUMVENT THE NATURE OF REDUCTIONS".

FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE FOR SUB-CEILINGS(1)

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8. IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED THAT ONE WAY TO DEFINE THE DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY TO RESTRUCTURE FORCES WOULD BE TO PERMIT A RANGE OF NUMERICAL SUB-CEILINGS ON GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER (ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARILY EXPRESSED IN THOSE TERMS IN AN MBFR AGREEMENT) WHICH COULD VARY FROM THE GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER LEVELS REMAINING IN THE NGA AFTER REDUCTIONS (POST-PHASE II) BY ANY AMOUNT UP TO AN AGREED MAXIMUM, I.E. THE "FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE", BEARING IN

MIND THAT IF THE MANPOWER OF ONE FORCE IS INCREASED BY ANY AMOUNT UP TO THE AGREED MAXIMUM, THE MANPOWER OF THE OTHER FORCE MUST BE DECREASED A LIKE AMOUNT SO THAT THE RESULTING TOTAL OF GROUND PLUS AIR MANPOWER DOES NOT EXCEED THE AGREED COMBINED GROUND/AIR MANPOWER CEILING.

FOOTNOTE:

(1) THE MBFR WG HAVE PREVIOUSLY EXAMINED THIS APPROACH, IN SOME DETAIL, IN THE CONTEXT OF A COMBINED AIR/GROUND COMMON CEILING WITH OPTIONAL AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN AC/276-D(75)5

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 /088 W

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INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

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9. UNLESS PROHIBITED IN SOME WAY BY THE PROVISIONS OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT, EACH SIDE COULD DECIDE WHEN AND IF TO USE TIS ALLOWANCE. AT ANY GIVEN POINT, THEN, POST-PHASE II RESIDUAL MANPOWER LEVELS IN THE NGA COULD REMAIN UNCHANGED OR CHANGED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING NINE SCENARIOS

	MNAO	WP		
	GROUND	GROUND	AIR	
	M'POWER	M'POWER	M'POWER	M'POWER
SCENARIO	NO LEVEL	LEVEL	LEVEL	LEVEL
1.	UNCHANGED	UNCHANGED	UNCHANGED	UNCHANGED
2	UNCHANGED	UNCHANGED	INCREASED	DECREASED
3	UNCHANGED	UNCHANGED	DECREASED	INCREASED
4	INCREASED	DECREASED	UNCHANGED	UNCHANGED
5	INCREASED	DECREASED	INCREASED	DECREASED
6	INCREASED	DECREASED	DECREASED	INCREASED
7	DECREASED	INCREASED	UNCHANGED	UNCHANGED

8 DECREASED INCREASED INCREASED DECREASED
9 DECREASED INCREASED DECREASED INCREASED

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10. ACCORDINGLY, THE DISPARITY BETWEEN NATO AND WP AIR AND GROUND FORCES IN THE NGA, POST-PHASE II, COULD REMAIN UNCHANGED OR VARY AS MUCH AS TWICE THE AGREED "FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE". FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE "FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE" WAS SET AT 30,000, THEN UNDER SCENARIO 8 ABOVE, WHATEVER DISPARITY EXISTED BETWEEN NATO AND WP GROUND FORCES AFTER PHASE II REDUCTIONS WOULD INCREASE BY 60,000 IN FAVOUR OF WP GROUND FORCES.

OVERLAPPING SUB-CEILINGS

1. THE US HAS SUGGESTED(1) THAT ONE APPROACH WOULD BE TO SPECIFY FORCE STRENGTHS FOR BOTH GROUND AND AIR FORCES; HOWEVER, THE COMBINED TOTAL OF BOTH GROUND AND AIR PERSONNEL WOULD EXCEED THE OVERALL COMMON CEILING. IN THIS APPROACH EITHER SERVICE COULD BE INCREASED, AT THE COST OF DECREASING THE OTHER, BUT ONLY WITHIN THE SPECIFIED AMOUNTS.

12. THUS, IF THE COMBINED AIR/GROUND COMMON CEILING WERE SET AT 900,000, IT WOULD BE HYPOTHETICALLY POSSIBLE TO SET THE MAXIMUM NATO GROUND FORCE MANPOWER STRENGTH IN THE NGA, POST-PHASE II

, AT, SAY, 730,000 AND THE MAXIMUM NATO AIR MANPOWER FIGURE AT, SAY, 210,000. HOWEVER, THIS WOULD MEAN THAT, POST-PHASE II, COMBINED NATO AIR AND GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE NGA COULD CLIMB TO 940,000. ON CONTRARY, IF, FOR EXAMPLE, NATO SHOULD WISH TO INCREASE ITS GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE NGA TO THE SET MAXIMUM OF 730,000, IT

COULD ONLY DO SO BY DECREASING ITS AIR MANPOWER TO 170,000. THUS MAINTAINING ITS COMBINED AIR AND MANPOWER STRENGTH AT THE AGREED COMBINED AIR/GROUND COMMON CEILING OF 900,000.

13. THE OVERLAPPING SUB-CEILING APPROACH IS THEREFORE NOTHING MORE THAN THE FLEXIBLE ALLOWANCE APPROACH STATED IN DIFFERENT TERMS. THE EFFECT OF THE OVERLAPPING APPROACH, LIKE THAT OF THE FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE, WOULD BE TO PERMIT A RANGE OF NUMERICAL SUB-CEILINGS ON GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER WHICH COULD VARY FROM THE GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER LEVELS REMAINING IN THE NGA AFTER REDUCTIONS (POST-PHASE II) BY ANY AMOUNT UP TO AN AGREED MAXIMUM. ALSO, LIKE THE FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE APPROACH, AT ANY GIVEN TIME, POST-PHASE II, RESIDUAL MANPOWER LEVELS IN THE NGA COULD REMAIN UNCHANGED OR CHANGE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NINE SCENARIOS SHOWN IN PARA 9 AND THE DISPARITIES

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BETWEEN NATO AND WP FORCES IN THE NGA WOULD VARY AS THE SCENARIOS CHANGE.

REQUIRMENT FOR FORCE STRUCTURING

14. KNOWN NATO PLANS FOR RATIONALISATION/SPECIALISATION, WHICH IN GENERAL RELATE TO A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS AHEAD, AND OTHERS UNDER CONSIDERATION INVOLVING FORCE STRUCTURES DO NOT CALL FOR INCREASES IN THE OVERALL ALLIANCE AGGREGATE AIR MANNING LEVELS(1). ALL ALLIES, EXCEPT THE UK WHICH FORESEES AN INCREASE OF ABOUT 600 AIR FORCE PERSONNEL IN THE NGA, HAVE STATED THEY HAVE NO CURRENT PLANS FOR AIR MANPOWER INCREASES(2). THESE UK INCREASES WOULD, HOWEVER, BE COMPLETED WITHIN TWO YEARS. THEY WOULD BE IRRELEVANT TO CONSIDERATION OF LONGER TERM FLEXIBILITY REQUIREMENTS. OTHER THAN THE UK REQUIREMENT, THERE IS NO IDENTIFIABLE REQUIREMENT FOR INCREASING NATO AIR FORCES. THE POSSIBILITY THAT ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS WILL EXIST IN THE FUTURE CANNOT BE EXCLUDED.

FOOTNOTES:

(1) AC/276-D(74)11

(2) AC/276-D(74)11

END FOOTNOTES

15. SINCE ALLIED NATIONS HAVE NO CURRENT PLANS TO RESTRUCTURE ONE FORCE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE OTHER, FOR THE NEXT FIVE YEARS, ANY OF THE APPROACHES TO SUB-CEILINGS (APPROACHES 1-4 AND THE THREE ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES) WOULD APPEAR TO MEET CURRENT ALLIED RESTRUCTURING REQUIREMENTS. FOR THE LONGER TERM, HOWEVER, ONLY APPROACH 1 WOULD PERMIT ALL POSSIBLE FUTURE ALLIED RESTRUCTURING REQUIREMENTS TO BE MET. THE OTHER THREE APPROACHES IF UNQUALIFIED WOULD ALL LIMIT THE MANPOWER OF ONE, OR MORE, SERVICES.

END TEXT

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